在英美法下，一方宣告不履行，守约方一般可以选择终止合同并请求赔偿，或者继续履行合同并在履行完毕后要求支付合同价款。但是，如果守约方没有坚持履行合同的“正当利益”，又或者合同需要违约方配合方能履行，则守约方不能坚持履行合同。
一方宣告不履行，守约方在什么情况下可以继续履行合同？
彭禧雯 石佳霖
英国法下的预期违约是指在合同的履行期限届满之前，合同的一方以其言论或行为明确表示不履行合同，或者使自己丧失履行合同的能力。在预期违约的情况下，守约方一般有两种选择：（1）终止合同并请求赔偿；（2）继续履行并在履行完毕后要求支付合同价款。
在实务中，守约方在很多情况下会希望继续履行合同，比如当标的物比较特殊，或者完成合同有利于守约方商业发展的时候。此外，如果证明损失有困难，继续履行然后要求支付合同价款也不失为更保险的选择。但是，守约方履行合同的权利并非没有限制的。在英美法下，如果没有“正当利益”，又或者合同需要违约方配合方能履行，则守约方不能坚持履行合同。
White and Carter 原则
在 White and Carter案中，合同双方签订了一份合同，根据该合同White and Carter在3年的期间内为被告的修车厂做广告，并获得约定的价款。在合同订立后的同一天内，被告突然要求White and Carter取消合同，理由是被告是基于错误而订立该合同的，但White and Carter仍继续为被告做广告，并要求被告支付合同价款（而不是主张损失赔偿）。原告的主张在苏格兰法院的两审中均被驳回，但最终以3:2的多数在上议院胜诉。
Reid勋爵的判决属于多数意见，他指出，合同法的基本原则是在一方预期违约的情况下，守约方有权选择继续履行合同。但是，此一基本原则受限于两种例外情况：（1）守约方（对于履行合同）没有正当利益的情况；（2）履行合同需要另一方配合的情况。
守约方没有 “正当利益”
对于“正当利益”此一例外情形，Reid勋爵进行了如下论述：
“如果一个人在没有经济方面或是其他方面的正当利益的情况下坚持履行合同，而不是主张损失赔偿，那么，在对其自身没有任何益处的情况下，不应该允许他使得合同的另一方承担更大的损失。”
作为对上述例外的解释，Reid勋爵举了一个例子——一位专家被一家公司雇用，为起草一份详尽的报告而赴国外出差。在Reid勋爵看来，如果在合同项下的工作尚未开展之前公司就预期违约，那么专家不应被允许去白白花费公司数千英镑来准备报告。一笔远低于合同价款的赔偿已足以补偿专家所受的损失。
值得注意的是，此处Reid勋爵的论述并不清楚 ，上述规则似乎在White and Carter案中也可以被适用——被告在合同订立之后立即预期违约，我们同样可以说，一笔小于合同价款的赔偿就足以补偿White and Carter 所受的损失。
正因其标准过于模糊，正当利益这个概念长期以来一直备受批评。如果经济方面的利益属于正当利益（似乎White and Carter案中原告追求的就是经济利益），那么在绝大多数案件中，坚持履行合同都可以说是有 正当利益的，因为获取价款本身是属于经济利益。 因此，实务中违约方甚少以守约方没有正当利益为由，主张其不应被允许继续履行合同。
事实上，正当利益这个概念一般被适于用坚持履行合同毫无道理可言的案例。例如，在Attica Sea Carriers v Ferrostaal 案中， 法院判决船东无权坚持按照租约要求承租人负责修理船舶，原因是修理的费用高达船舶受损前后的价值差的四倍。
综上所述，“守约方没有正当利益”此一例外情形在实务中意义不大，除非守约方的行为极其不合理，否则不建议采用。
履行合同需要另一方配合的情况
在这个问题上，Reid勋爵在White and Carter案中论述如下：
“当然，如果在原告履行合同义务的过程中需要由被告配合，则原告不能、法院亦不会强迫被告采取行动。在这样的情况下，原告的合同义务无法履行完毕，其唯一的救济就是要求被告赔偿损失。”
这份附带意见似乎认为，如果守约无法单方面履行合同，则合同在违约方预期违约时自动终止（“自动终止说”）。但是，英国最高法院近期作出的一个判决明确指出了上述理解是不正确的。
Societe Generale v Geys 案
该案主要的争议焦点之一是雇佣合同的一方的预期违约（例如，非法解雇）是否会使得使合同自动终止（因为在雇主不配合的情况下雇员无法履行合同义务）。法院的多数意见认为，根据合同法的基本原则，只有当守约方选择接受预期违约的情况下，预期违约才会导致合同终止（“选择终止说”）。因此，当雇主非法解雇雇员时，雇佣合同并不会自动终止。
如果是这样的话，雇员是否有权继续领取工资？Wilson勋爵正确地指出雇员无权继续领取工资，但是这和合同的继续存续并不冲突，因为雇员不能领工资，影响的是雇员能够获得的救济，而非合同的有效性。
只有当合同的一方履行了其在合同项下的义务后，他才有权利获得合同价款。如果合同的一方无需另一方的协助即可履行其合同义务，则根据White and Carter案确立的规则，其有权获得合同价款。但是，如果其无法单方面履行合同义务，则无权获得合同价款，此时他只能主张损失赔偿。
既然不管合同终止还是存续都只能主张赔偿，那么，合同是否有效这一点真的重要吗？Wilson勋爵在Geys案中作出了解答：
“有时候这一点的确很重要……是否涨薪可能取决于合同是否持续到某一个特定的日子。养老金的数额也可能是根据雇员工作一整年的最终工资或者包含最后一个完整工作年度的累计工资来计算的。”
Geys案本身就是个很好的例子。根据Geys先生的雇佣合同，Geys先生能否获得一笔较高的补偿金仅仅取决于雇佣合同是否存续，而不取决于任何其他因素（比如他是否上班）。因此，为获得这笔较高的补偿金，Geys先生唯一需要做的就是使雇佣合同继续存续，Geys先生通过选择维持合同效力来做到了这一点，因而获得较高的补偿金。
此外，合同的存续还可能影响到守约方能否获得诸如临时禁令等其他救济。如果我们采用自动终止说，当违约方宣告不履行时合同即自动终止，那么守约方就不可能获得临时禁令了。此外，违约方还可以通过其违约行为才决定什么时候终止合同，这明显是对守约方极为不利的。因此，英国最高法院支持选择终止说是合理而正确的决定。
结论
在一方预期违约的情况下：
（1）如果守约方可以单方面履行合同义务，无需违约方配合，则其可以自由选择履行合同并要求对方支付合同价款，或是终止合同请求赔偿损失；
（2）如果守约方不能单方面履行合同，也不代表合同必然终止（除非守约方选择终止合同），只是一般而言守约方只能请求赔偿损失；在一些特殊的情况下，比如标的物为特定物，守约方可以基于合同请求法院颁布临时禁令，禁止违约方转售标的物；
（3）实务中基本不存在守约方对于履行合同没有正当利益的情况，一般情况下，守约方不必担心此一例外会对履行合同的权利构成限制。
英文原文
Rationalising the Right to Affirm a Contract
This article discusses whether, and to what extent, a party is allowed to persist in unwanted performance where the other party repudiates the contract.
Repudiation occurs when, before performance is due, a party by words or conduct evinces a clear intention not to perform the contract; or disables itself from performing. In case of repudiation, the innocent party has two choices: (1) accept the repudiation (thereby terminating the contract) and sue for damages; or (2) affirm the contract and retains the right to enforce the contract.
The White and Carter principle
Problem may arise when one party declares that it has abandoned the contract, but the other party insists on performing the contract and claims the contract price. This is the problem faced by the court in White and Carter. The parties entered into a contract under which White and Carter is to display advertisements for the defendant’s garage for three years in return for a sum of money. On the same day the contract is entered into, the defendant required White and Carter to cancel the contract on the grounds that they made a mistake, but White and Carter proceeded with the advertisement and claims for the contract price (as opposed to damages). The claim was refused on two occasions in Scotland, but allowed on appeal to the House of Lords by a narrow 3 to 2 margin.
Lord Reid, giving the leading judgment, confirms that the innocent party has an unfettered right to choose whether to accept the repudiation or not. Where the injured party elects to affirm the contract, he can bring an action for the agreed sum (i.e. contract price). However, his Lordship also articulated two possible exceptions: (1) where there is no legitimate interest; (2) where co-operation from the other party is required.
“Legitimate interest” exception
On this issue, Lord Reid made the following statement:
“It may well be that, if it can be shown that a person has no legitimate interest, financial or otherwise, in performing the contract rather than claiming damages, he ought not to be allowed to saddle the other party with an additional burden with no benefit to himself.”
As an illustration Lord Reid gave an example of an expert who is employed by a company to travel abroad for the purpose of drafting an elaborate report. In Lord Reid’s view, the expert should not be allowed to waste thousands of pounds in preparing the report if the company has repudiated the contract before anything has been done under it. A far smaller amount of damages would compensate him for his loss. However, it would appear that the same thing could be said in White and Carter – the defendant repudiated the contract immediately after the contract was entered into and a smaller amount of damages would compensate White and Carter for its loss.
For this reason, the legitimate interest exception has long been criticized for being too vague. If financial interest is considered legitimate (this seems to be the case in White and Carter) then in a vast majority of cases insistence on the contract can be justified because the innocent party will have a financial interest in earning the contract price.
As a matter of fact, the legitimate interest exception is usually invoked in cases where the innocent party’s insistence on the contract is “wholly unreasonable”. For example, in Attica Sea Carriers v Ferrostaal, it was held that the charterer ought not be entitled to insist that the ship be repaired in accordance with the charterparty because the cost of repair was four times the difference in value between a repaired and an unrepaired ship.
Thus, the legitimate interest exception is better understood as a device to scrutinise unreasonable behavior on the part of the innocent party.
Where co-operation from the other party is required
On the issue of co-operation, Lord Reid said the following in White and Carter:
“Of course, if it had been necessary for the defender to do or accept anything before the contract could be completed by the pursuers, the pursuers could not and the court would not have compelled the defender to act, the contract would not have been completed and the pursuers’ only remedy would have been damages.”
The dicta seemingly suggests that if the completion of the contract requires the other party’s co-operation, the repudiation would automatically terminate the contract (the “automatic theory”). But a recent UK Supreme Court decision confirms that the above interpretation is incorrect.
Societe Generale v Geys
One of the main issues in the case is whether a party’s repudiation of an employment contract (e.g. by wrongful dismissal) will automatically bring the contract to an end. The majority finds that the general principle that a repudiation only terminates the contract if the innocent party elects to accept the repudiation (the “elective theory”) applies equally to an employment contract. Thus, an employment contract is not automatically terminated when an employer wrongfully dismisses an employee.
One may ask, if that is the case wouldn’t the employee be entitled to continue to receive salary even though he was dismissed? On this issue, Lord Wilson correctly pointed out that it is the range of remedies that is limited, not the right to affirm the contract.
A party will only be entitled to an agreed sum (i.e. the contract price) if he had done all that is required to make the action available. If a party can perform the contract without assistance of the other party he will be entitled to the agreed sum as in White and Carter. If, on the other hand, a party cannot perform his contractual duties so as to entitle him to receive the agreed sum under the contract, then he can only claim damages.
This explains why in most wrongful dismissal cases the employees are only entitled to damages – most often they are unable to carry out their duties under the employment contract without the employer’s co-operation. Thus, the condition to payment could not been fulfilled.
Does it really matter? Lord Wilson has again given us the answer in Geys:
“The answer is that sometimes it does matter… An increase in salary may depend on the survival of the contract until a particular date. The amount of a pension may be calculated by reference to the final salary paid throughout a completed year of service or to an aggregate of salaries including the final completed year...”
Geys itself is a good example. In Mr. Geys’s employment contract a higher termination payment is only subject to the subsistence of the contract and nothing else. As such all that Mr. Geys has to do in order to be entitled to the higher payment is to keep the contract alive, which he did by affirming the contract.
Furthermore, the subsistence of the contract may also affect the availability of other remedies such as an injunction. If the contract is automatically terminated when the default party repudiates the contract, the innocent party would never be able to obtain an injunction.
Thus, it is important to recognise the right to affirm a contract as a right that is independent from a right to claim the agreed sum; and that the “co-operation exception” is not a real exception to the right to affirm. It is, at most, a limitation on the remedies available to an innocent party.
(英文撰稿：彭禧雯/Ellen Pang， 北京大学法学学士、香港大学法律博士、牛津大学法律硕士。
中文翻译：石佳霖/Jialin Shi，北京大学法学学士，汇仲律师事务所律师。)
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