近期三个ICSID仲裁案件有仲裁员回避的现象造成了ICSID仲裁员回避的标准有所降低的错觉。研究发现这三个案件均未偏离ICSID以往裁决中所采用的判断仲裁员是否应予回避的标准。ICSID 仲裁采用的“明显证据”的证明标准依然高于国际商事仲裁常用的“合理怀疑”标准。
投资仲裁 | ICSID仲裁员回避的标准是否真的降低了？
彭禧雯／Ellen Pang, 石佳霖／Jialin Shi
在ICSID过去五十年的历史中，仲裁员回避的请求被提出超过四十次，但只有一次获得了支持。近期却有三个回避请求得到了支持，这被认为是投资仲裁领域中具有突破性的发展。
2013年11月，ICSID行政理事会的主席在Blue Bank案中支持了委内瑞拉提出的对仲裁员回避的请求，这个决定在国际上备受关注。Blue Bank案的裁决作出后不到一个月，主席又在Burlington案中支持了厄瓜多尔的回避申请，理由是仲裁员表现出了对厄瓜多尔律师的不满，该案是继Blue Bank案后第一个请求仲裁员回避的案件。Caratube案则是首次由两位未被请求回避的仲裁员（而非行政理事会的主席）决定另一名仲裁员需要回避。
有观点认为，这些成功请求回避的案例说明了ICSID仲裁员回避的标准有所降低。但是，如果对三个案例的裁决进行细致的分析，就会发现前述观点是没有依据的。如下文说明的，这三个案件均未偏离ICSID以往裁决中所采用的判断仲裁员是否应予回避的标准。
华盛顿公约的要求
根据华盛顿公约第14条第1款，一位仲裁员必须能够“被信赖作出独立的判断”。该公约第57条进一步规定，“明显缺乏第14条第1款规定的品质”是请求仲裁员回避的依据。
根据过往的案例，第57条所称的“明显”所指的不是缺乏独立性的严重程度，而是证明该等缺乏所需要达到的标准。也就是说，请求回避的一方要想获得支持，需要证明的不是仲裁员严重地偏私（biased），而是他存在偏私这一点是显而易见的。
著名的Vivendi v Argentina案很好地解释了“明显”此一要求所指向的证明标准。在该案中，仲裁庭认为“明显”一词排除了“仅仅依赖推测或假设而提出的回避请求”。即，需要能够实际证明（而非推测）仲裁员存在偏私或偏私的表象（appearance of bias）。
Suez案的仲裁庭则是这么看的：“[请求回避的一方]要想获得支持，其所证明的事实必须能使一个充分知情的理性人得出该仲裁员清楚地或显而易见地缺乏独立判断的能力和中立性这一结论。” Crawford教授认为，仲裁员回避的标准有着提高的趋势——Vivendi案认为申请回避的事实基础不能仅仅是推测；Suez案则认为必须有明显的证据，这个标准基本上排除了商事仲裁中适用的“合理怀疑”标准。
有趣的是，Blue Bank案、Burlington 案和Caratube案中适用的正是Suez案中确立的更为严格的标准。
Blue Bank v Venezuela案
委内瑞拉以关系冲突（relationship conflict）和争议焦点冲突（issue conflict）为由请求仲裁员回避。关系冲突所依据的事实是，该仲裁员是Baker & Mckenzie马德里分所的合伙人，而该律所的纽约分所正在参与另一起针对委内瑞拉提起的ICSID仲裁。争议焦点冲突所依据的事实是，该仲裁员在本案中需要就与纽约分所正在代理的案件中相同或类似的争议焦点作出裁决。
ICSID行政理事会的主席认为“明显”一词的意思是“清楚”或“显而易见的”，这一认定主要是依据Suez案。需要注意的是，尽管这个案件的裁决再次确认了证明有存在偏私的表象（而不需证明实际存在偏私）就足够了，但这一点也仅仅是重述了之前的案例中已经确立的标准，并没有把标准降低。
对案件事实进行分析后，主席认为，“共用同一公司名称”，加上合伙人的收入不局限于其所在分所的经营所得，“暗示了各个分所之间有一定的关联或协调”。此外，两个案件十分相似并且都在仲裁过程中，这使得仲裁员如果继续任职，则很可能要就与另一个案件相关联的争议焦点作出裁决。基于上述事实，一个知情的第三人会认为本案存在明显的偏私表象。
Burlington Resources Inc v Ecuador 案
2013年12月13日，就在Blue Bank案裁决作出后不到一个月，ICSID主席支持了厄瓜多尔请求Francisco Orrego Vicuña教授回避的申请，原因是教授在仲裁过程中表现出了对厄瓜多尔律师的不满。这起源于教授对厄瓜多尔律师提出的回避申请的回应：“真正有专业操守问题的似乎是厄瓜多尔律师的主张以及其处理机密信息的方式”（the real ethical question seems to lie with [Ecuador’s counsel’s] submissions and the handling of confidential information）。
主席适用了其在Blue Bank案中陈述的标准，认为该评价不是为了回应厄瓜多尔的回避申请而作出的，显示出仲裁员有偏私的表象。
Caratube v Kazakhstan案
本案中，申请回避的理由是仲裁员曾经参与针对哈萨克斯坦的另一起 ICSID 仲裁－Ruby Roz。申请人提出，两个案件的事实基础大部分重叠，该仲裁员曾在Ruby Roz案中接触过相关事实、听取过证人证词以及法律主张，有很大的预先判断（pre-judge）的风险。
值得注意的是，申请人主张适用的标准是商事仲裁中惯用的“合理怀疑”。被申请人则主张应沿用“明显证据”的标准。两位未被申请回避的仲裁员依据Suez, Blue Bank 和 Burlington 案中确立的标准，认同被申请人提出的更高的标准，但是却支持了申请人提出的回避请求。由此可见，标准依然是较高的标准，只是本案的事实满足了较高的标准。
两位仲裁员认为，被申请回避的仲裁员确实对案件事实有一定认识，而另外两位仲裁员则没有。再者，很难要求该仲裁员在自己的脑子里建立“防火墙”。一个合理的第三方在得知这些情况后，会认为该仲裁员参与了Ruby Roz案此一事实会影响其客观性。因此，回避请求得到了支持。
结论
ICSID 仲裁中采用的回避标准一直以来都被批评为定得太高。近期一连串成功申请回避的案例可能会造成标准有所降低的错觉。但是，如上文所阐述的，这样的说法是没有依据的。事实上，在三个成功案例之后，也有不少回避申请被驳回。当然，有了这三个案例，以后仲裁庭可能会更敢于支持回避请求，但是就仲裁员回避问题而言，ICSID 仲裁的证明标准依然是国际仲裁中最高的。
[英文原文]
Challenges to Arbitrators in ICSID Arbitration: A Move Towards a Lower Threshold?
The recent successful challenges to arbitrators in three ICSID arbitrations were seen as a groundbreaking development of investment treaty jurisprudence. In the 50-year history of ICSID, there had been over forty challenges to arbitrators but only one was upheld.
The taboo is said to be broken when the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council upheld a challenge against an arbitrator in the Blue Bank case (note 1) in November 2013. Less than a month from the Blue Bank decision, the Chairman upheld another challenge in Burlington (note 2), the first challenge following Blue Bank. Equally significant is Caratube (note 3), the first case where two unchallenged arbitrators (instead of the ICSID chairman) upheld the disqualification proposal of a fellow arbitrator.
Commentators suggest that the recent successful challenges represent a lowering of the threshold of challenge to arbitrators (note 4). However, a careful analysis of the reasoning in the three cases reveals that such impression is unfounded. As will be demonstrated below, there is no suggestion that any of the three cases departed from the test adopted in previous ICSID decisions.
The requirements of the ICSID Convention
Under Article 14(1) of the ICSID Convention, an arbitrator must ‘be relied upon to exercise independent judgment’. Article 57 further provides that an arbitrator can be challenged on the basis ‘of any fact indicating a manifest lack of the qualities required by 14(1).’
It is well established that ‘manifest’ does not refer to the seriousness of the lack of independence, but to the standard to which the lack must be established. In order for a challenging party to succeed, what needs to be established is not that the challenged arbitrator is manifestly biased, but that it is ‘manifest’ (or clear) that he appears to be biased.
One may ask what does the word ‘manifest’ suggest in terms of the standard of proof. The answer can be found in Vivendi v Argentina, where the tribunal held that the word ‘manifest’ operates to exclude ‘reliance on speculative assumptions or arguments’(note 5). That is, circumstances actually established (and not merely supposed or inferred) must place in clear doubt the appearance of impartiality (note 6).
The Suez tribunal adopted a different formulation: “the [challenging party] to succeed must prove such facts that would lead an informed reasonable person to conclude that [the challenged arbitrator] clearly or obviously lacks the quality of being able to exercise independent judgment and impartiality.” (note 7) Professor Crawford opined that this is a move towards a higher threshold – Vivendi suggests that proof has to be ‘manifest’, not speculative; while Suez suggests that obvious evidence is required, impliedly rejecting the ‘reasonable doubt’ test applicable in commercial arbitration. (note 8)
It is the more stringent Suez formulation that is followed in Blue Bank, Burlington and Caratube.
Blue Bank v Venezuela
Venezuela’s challenge was made on the grounds of relationship conflict and issue conflict. The relationship conflict was based on the fact that the challenged arbitrator is a partner at Baker & Mckenzie’s Madrid office and that the firm’s New York office is acting in another ICSID arbitration against Venezuela. The issue conflict turns on the fact that the arbitrator would have to decide on issues identical or similar to that in the case which the New York office is arguing.
The ICSID chairman found that the word ‘manifest’ means ‘evident’ or ‘obvious’, relying inter alia on Suez. While the decision once again affirmed that it is sufficient to establish appearance of bias (as opposed to actual bias), it does no more than repeating the position that has been established in previous authorities.
Applying the test to the facts, the Chairman found that:- the “sharing of a corporate name” and the fact that the arbitrator’s remuneration as a partner is not limited to the results of the activities of his office “imply a degree of connection or overall coordination” between the different offices; the similarities between the two cases and the fact that both cases are ongoing made it highly probable that the arbitrator would be in a position to decide issues that are relevant in the other case if he remained an arbitrator in this case. As such, a third party would find an obvious appearance of bias on a reasonable evaluation of the facts in this case.
Burlington Resources Inc v Ecuador
On 13th December 2013, less than one month after the Blue Bank decision, the ICSID Chairman upheld Ecuador’s challenge against Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña on the basis that Professor Vicuña Professor Orrego Vicuña had displayed a lack of impartiality to the detriment of Ecuador during the course of arbitration. The challenge arose out of Professor Vicuña’s response to Ecuador’s challenge, in which he asserted, ‘the real ethical question seems to lie with [Ecuador’s counsel’s] submissions and the handling of confidential information.’ The chairman applied the same test he articulated in Blue Bank and concluded that the above response manifestly evidences an appearance of bias as it was not made for the purpose of addressing the proposal for disqualification. (note 9)
Caratube v Kazakhstan
The challenge in Caratube centred on the challenged arbitrator’s previous involvement in another case Ruby Roz Agricol v Kazakhstan. The claimants asserted that there is significant overlap in the underlying facts between the Ruby Roz case and Caratube. The fact that the challenged arbitrator was privy to the facts, witness testimony and legal arguments in Ruby Roz gives rise to a manifest risk of pre-judgment.
Claimants argued that the ‘reasonable doubt test’ adopted in commercial arbitration is applicable. The Respondent, on the other hand, submitted that there must be ‘clear evidence’ of the challenged arbitrator’s lack of impartiality. The unchallenged arbitrators sided with the Respondent on the test, following Suez, Blue Bank and Burlington, but upheld the challenge in favour of the claimants. As such, it is clear that the threshold is still a high one, but the facts of the case met the higher threshold.
It was found that the challenged arbitrator benefitted from knowledge of facts which may not be available to the two other arbitrators and that he cannot reasonably be asked to maintain a “Chinese wall” in his own mind. A reasonable and informed third party would find it highly likely that his exposure in Ruby Roz would lead to his objectivity and open-mindedness being tainted. The challenge is thus upheld.
Conclusion
The high threshold for disqualification of arbitrators under the ICSID system has long been a subject of heavy criticism. The recent successful challenges may have given rise to the misconception that the threshold has been lowered. As demonstrated above, such allegation is unfounded. As a matter of fact, after the three ICSID cases, there were quite a few cases where challenge of arbitrators was disallowed. While future tribunals may feel less pressured to reject challenges in the face of overwhelming precedent, the required standard of proof (evident or obvious) remains the highest in international arbitration.
Endnotes
1. Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal (12 November 2013).
2. Burlington Resources, Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña (13 December 2013).
3. Caratube International Oil Company LLP and Devincci Salah Hourani v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch (20 March 2014).
4. Karel Daele, ‘The Standard for Disqualifying Arbitrators Finally Settled and Lowered’ (2014) 29 ICSID Rev—FILJ 296, 302: ‘By doing so, the ICSID Chairman appears to return to the reasonable doubts test as it was applied in the earlier 2000’s.’
5. Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on the Challenge to the President of the Committee (3 October 2001), para. 25.
6. Ibid.
7. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 and ARB/03/19, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, para. 29.
8. Professor James Crawford, ‘Challenges to Arbitrators in ICSID Arbitrations’ in PCA Peace Palace Centenary Seminar, The Hague (11 October 2013).
9. Burlington (n 4), paras. 79-80.
（英文原文：彭禧雯/Ellen Pang, 北京大学法学学士、香港大学法律博士、牛津大学法律硕士。
中文翻译：石佳霖/Jialin Shi，北京大学法学学士、北京汇仲律师事务所助理律师。）
声明：本文观点仅供参考，不可视为汇仲律师事务所及其律师对有关问题出具的正式法律意见。如您有任何法律问题或需要法律意见，请与本所联系。
汇仲律师事务所的网址为：www.huizhonglaw.com